Actions triggered by pull_request_target events have access to all
repository secrets, so it is unsafe to use them when executing untrusted
code. The pr-code-format workflow does not execute any untrusted code,
but it passes untrused input into clang-format. An attacker could use
this to exploit a flaw in clang-format and potentially gain access to
the repository secrets.
By splitting the workflow, we can use the pull_request target which is
more secure and isolate the issue write permissions in a separate job.
The pull_request target also makes it easier to test changes to the
code-format-helepr.py script, because the version of the script from the
pull request will be used rather than the version of the script from
main.
Fixes#77142
This reverts commit bc06cd5cbcfc22dd976f6742d10bc934e1353b8a.
This caused the job to fail for PRs which still had an older version
of code-format-helper.py in their tree.
Actions triggered by pull_request_target events have access to all
repository secrets, so it is unsafe to use them when executing untrusted
code. The pr-code-format workflow does not execute any untrusted code,
but it passes untrused input into clang-format. An attacker could use
this to exploit a flaw in clang-format and potentially gain access to
the repository secrets.
By splitting the workflow, we can use the pull_request target which is
more secure and isolate the issue write permissions in a separate job.
The pull_request target also makes it easier to test changes to the
code-format-helepr.py script, because the version of the script from the
pull request will be used rather than the version of the script from
main.
Fixes#77142
