__asan_region_is_poisoned() uses an exclusive end address (end = beg + size) to validate the region [beg, end) and to compute the aligned inner shadow region. This causes correctness issue near memory range upper boundary and could trigger address space overflow on 32-bit targets. 1. Incorrect handling of the last byte of a memory range The implementation checks AddrIsInMem(end) instead of the last application byte (end - 1). For regions ending at the last byte of Low/Mid/HighMem (e.g. __asan_region_is_poisoned(kHighMemEnd, 1)), this returns end (kHighMemEnd + 1) instead of the original pointer. This behavior is inconsistent with the function’s semantics and with __asan_address_is_poisoned(). 2) address space overflow and invalid shadow range If a region ends at the top of the virtual address space (kHighMemEnd), e.g. on 32-bit targets, end = beg + size could wrap to 0. This violated the invariant beg < end and could trigger the CHECK failure. Additionally, overflow in RoundUpTo alignment computations for aligned_b could produce an invalid shadow region spanning LowShadow to HighShadow across ShadowGap, leading mem_is_zero() to access unmapped memory and crash. Fix by switching to an inclusive last byte: last = beg + size - 1 All checks are now performed on beg and last. The aligned inner shadow region is also computed from [beg, last]. Additional guard for aligned_b prevents the mapping to shadow if aligned_b is wrapped (in this case the aligned inner region is also empty and doesn't require the shadow scan via mem_is_zero()). This fixes incorrect return values at memory range ends and prevents overflow related crashes on 32-bit targets. Test is extended to cover these boundary cases. --------- Co-authored-by: Vitaly Buka <vitalybuka@gmail.com>
33 lines
990 B
C++
33 lines
990 B
C++
// RUN: %clangxx_asan %s -o %t
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// RUN: not %run %t 2>&1 | FileCheck %s
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// REQUIRES: asan-64-bits
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#include <inttypes.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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int main() {
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char *p = new char;
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char *dest = new char;
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const size_t offset = 0x4567890123456789;
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// The output here needs to match the output from the sanitizer runtime,
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// which includes 0x and prints hex in lower case.
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//
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// On Windows, %p omits %0x and prints hex characters in upper case,
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// so we use PRIxPTR instead of %p.
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fprintf(stderr, "Expected bad addr: %#" PRIxPTR "\n",
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reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(p + offset - 1));
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// Flush it so the output came out before the asan report.
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fflush(stderr);
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memmove(dest, p, offset);
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return 0;
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}
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// CHECK: Expected bad addr: [[ADDR:0x[0-9,a-f]+]]
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// CHECK: AddressSanitizer: unknown-crash on address [[ADDR]]
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// CHECK: Address [[ADDR]] is a wild pointer inside of access range of size 0x4567890123456789
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